The two foreign ministers announced the talks at near simultaneous briefings following a telephone conversation.

“The foreign minister of Pakistan has invited me to go Islamabad on the 15th of July,” India’s Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna told reporters.

“I am planning to visit Islamabad and I am looking forward to these talks,” he added.

India hoped the talks would be “helpful in building trust between the two countries,” he added. “Let’s hope that these efforts will be fruitful.”

During discussions in the Bhutanese capital Thimphu late last month, the prime ministers of both countries agreed that their foreign ministers would meet soon to draw up a road map for future talks.

India broke off a comprehensive peace dialogue with Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 that left 166 people dead.

Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi described his conservation with Krishna Tuesday as “very good”, quoted him as saying “he would be delighted to visit” and that July 15 was a “mutually convenient” date.

“We were both of the opinion that great responsibility has been given to us to carry forward the process, to bridge the trust deficit and create an enabling environment to carry forward the process,” Qureshi said.

“I think we’ve had a good discussion and we will build it from here…recognising the fact that it isn’t going to be easy, recognising the fact that there are no quick fixes, but sincerity is there,” he said.

Qureshi said the home ministers of India and Pakistan would meet on the sidelines of a regional conference in Islamabad on June 26, and that he planned to visit New Delhi for a following round of talks after the July meeting.

Since the Mumbai attacks, India has repeatedly rebuffed Pakistani calls for a resumption, insisting that Islamabad had not done enough to bring the Pakistan-based militants that India blames for the carnage to justice.

The foreign minister meeting will essentially be “talks about talks”, or discussions about how to reopen the stalled comprehensive dialogue.

Contact between the estranged neighbours has intensified in recent months, seen partly as a result of US pressure for a solution in the volatile region, and partly a drive by India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

In February, the two sides managed a meeting between their senior foreign ministry officials, which resulted in a vague pledge to keep the doors to dialogue open.

The meeting between Singh and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, dubbed the “Thimphu thaw” in the Indian media, was seen as a move forward.

The July talks will be the third major contact between the countries in six months.

The bitter South Asian rivals have fought three wars since the subcontinent’s 1947 partition.

Hamid Mir

Education

Mir was born and educated in Lahore. He attended University Laboratory School New Campus and Government Central Model School, where he completed his Matric examination. He earned his intermediate degree from Government Science College and his B.A. degree from Government College. He earned his master’s degree in mass communications from theUniversity of Punjab in 1989. He played cricket but left the sport after the sudden death of his father.^[3]

[edit]Family

Hamid Mir belongs to a literary and journalistic family. His grandfather Mir Abdul Aziz was a famous poet in Urdu, Persian, and Punjabi inSialkot who actively participated in the movement for the creation of Pakistan under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah^{[citation needed]}. Hamid Mir’s father, the late Professor Waris Mir,^[4] was a columnist for Daily Jang and a critic of military dictator General Ziaul Haq,^[5] for which he was removed from the chairmanship of the Mass Communication Department of the University in the 1980s.^[5] Professor Waris Mir died on July 9, 1987 in mysterious circumstances at the age of 48; it has been alleged that he was poisoned by the then military regime. Hamid Mir joined journalism immediately after the death of his father at a very young age.

Two brothers of Hamid Mir are also journalists. Amir Mir works for The News International^{[citation needed]} and Imran Mir works for Pakistan Television. A third brother, Faisal Mir, is an industrialist. Hamid Mir’s wife worked with Pakistan television and for a private television channel for many years. Hamid Mir has two children, Arafat Mir and Ayesha Mir. His children and wife were forced to spend at least three months outside Pakistan from May 2007 to July 2007 for security reasons.^[6]

Career

1. ^ “Inside Pakistan: Sky Special Report“. 2008-02-27. Retrieved on 2009-04-27.
2. ^ “‘Capital Talk’ enthralls protesters on road“. 2008-06-14. Retrieved on 2009-07-01.
3. ^ Biography published in Daily Jinnah
4. ^ “The News, July 2008“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
5. ^ ^{a b} “The News, July 2007“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
6. ^ “NY Times“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
7. ^ ^{a b} “Musharraf’s Monster“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
8. ^ “How Osama has survived for six years“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
9. ^ “Al Qaeda and the Iranian Connection“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
10. ^ “Jang Editorial“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
11. ^ “The Rediff Interview/L K Advani“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
12. ^ “When death stared me in the face“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
13. ^ “Pakistani police storm TV channel“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
14. ^ “Musharraf calls to say sorry after police storm TV studio“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
15. ^ “Political Talk Defies Ban in Pakistan“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
16. ^ “‘Capital Talk’ enthralls protesters on road“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
17. ^ “Who assassinated Benazir Bhutto?“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
18. ^ “This Pakistani nailed Pak Govt’s lie on Kasab“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
19. ^ “Pakistan’s Deal with the Devil“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
20. ^ “CNN LATE EDITION WITH WOLF BLITZER“. 05 December 2004. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
21. ^ Al-Qaeda’s Hidden Arsenal and Sponsors:Interview with Hamid Mir
22. ^ “No al-Qaeda or Taliban leader was killed in recent US strikes“. 15 September 2008. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
23. ^ “8,000 foreign fighters in Fata ring alarm bells in Islamabad“. 21 July 2008. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
24. ^ ^{a b} “Hamid Mir — the last journalist to interview Osama bin Laden“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
25. ^ “The man who interviewed Osama bin Laden… 3 times“. Retrieved on 2009-06-13.
26. ^ “Sharief, Benazir ‘Raped’ Democracy: Najam Sethi“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
27. ^ “Risk is the beauty of journalism“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
28. ^ “Zaid Hamid exposes zionist hamid mir“. Retrieved on 2009-01-25.
29. ^ “Zaid Hamid on ABN Chicago Radio“. 2008-12-15. Retrieved on 2009-04-26.
30. ^ “This Pakistani nailed Pak Govt’s lie on Kasab“. HisdustanTimes.com. 2008-12-22. Retrieved on 2009-04-26.
31. ^ “Portraying Hamid Mir as America’s Enemy“. 2007-09-21. Retrieved on 2009-04-26.
32. ^ Juan Cole (2009-03-27). “Predator Strikes Stir anti-US “Hatred”“. IndyBay.org. Retrieved on 2009-04-27.
33. ^ “The Taliban Resurgence in Pakistan“. AsiaSociety.org. Retrieved on 2009-04-26.

Early life

Shahid Masood spent most of his childhood in Saudi Arabia. His father was a civil engineer who worked there for 15 years.^[1] He received an FSc from DJ Science College, Karachi, and subsequently attended Sindh Medical College receiving a MBBS degree.

[edit]Career

Shahid Masood’s father was a civil engineer in Saudi Arabia and he worked there for 15 years. Shahid spent his childhood in Taif and Riyadh. For seven years, Shahid went to the Pakistan International School in Riyadh. Shahid Two younger brothers were born in Saudi Arabia so the country is close to his heart.”

By training Shahid Masood is a medical doctor. He also taught surgery to medical students at Sindh Medical College, Karachi, Pakistan.

[edit]Views on News

Shahid Masood came into the spotlight with his program Views On News (launched after 9/11) Asia’s longest-running current affairs TV show. His show carried interviews with prominent people from politics, civil life, literature and culture. Politicians who have been interviewed on Views on News include President General Pervez Musharraf, former Pakistani Prime Ministers Shaukat Aziz, Benazir Bhutto and Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, MQM leader Altaf Hussain, PML-N leader Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif former Pakistani general A. A. K. Niazi (of East Pakistan fame), Abdul Rashid Ghazi, former CIA Director James Woolsey, and former ISI chief Hamid Gul. Famous writers who have appeared on the show include Ahmed Faraz, Dr. Israr Ahmad, Dr. Zakir Naik, the late Ashfaq Ahmed, Ahmed Nadeem Qasmi, Munnoo Bhai^{[citation needed]}, Asif Ali Zardari and late Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti along with his most wanted Balouch rebel grandson Bramdagh Bugti. It was Nawab Bugti’s last public appearance before he was killed in a military operation by the Pakistan Army.

[edit]GEO TV

On January 2007 Shahid Masood joined Geo TV^[2] which is owned by the Jang Group, the largest Urdu media group, as group executive director.

In late 2007 GEO Television was banned by General Musharraf after the imposition of emergency rule. However, even after the restoration of GEO’s transmission Dr. Masood’s show did not immediately resume. The lack of explanation led many^[who?] to believe that the network had struck a deal with the government, casting a shadow of doubt on GEO’s claim of being the only truly independent network in Pakistan.^{[citation needed]} However, Dr Shahid came back on air mid-April 2008, and hosted an interview with Asif Zardari.

On June 13, 2008 Dubai city administration threatened GEO to drop Masood’s show, among others, or risk losing its license as they “threatened the UAE’s relations with a friendly country.”^[3]

On Nov 30, 2008 Dr Shahid’s Meray Mutabiq was back on Geo TV in which he explained his departure from GEO to PTV and also repented on the fact that he should consider public opinion before taking such decisions.

[edit]On War on Terrorism

Ever since 9/11 Shahid Masood has been severely critical regarding the American-led War on Terrorism and the events unfolding upon theMuslims around the world as a result.^{[citation needed]} He often tends to analyze controversial issues, which were evident from his columns and interviews during the Afghan, Iraq or 2006 Lebanon War.^{[citation needed]}

[edit]PTV

On June 21, 2008, he assumed the office of Pakistan Television (PTV) chairman-cum-managing director.^[4] During his time at PTV he has produced the first ever independent audit report on corruption in the office, for which he came under pressure from Information minister and subsequently offered his resignation. Masood refused to back down from his stance on the audit report;^{[citation needed]} after meeting with Prime minister he tendered his resignation and was appointed as a Special Advisor to Prime Minister but after few days he resigned from that office as well. \^[5]

[edit]See also

• Pakistan Television
• GEO TV
• Views On News
• Hamid Mir
• Javed Malik
• ARY One World
• ARY Digital
• 2007 Pakistani state of emergency

By ADAM GOLDMAN and DEVLIN BARRETT (AP)

NEW YORK — When the American-born al-Qaida recruit Bryant Neal Vinas was captured in Pakistan late last year, he wasn’t whisked off to a military prison or a secret CIA facility in another country to be interrogated.

Instead, the itinerant terrorist landed in the hands of the FBI and was flown back to New York to face justice.

Months before President Barack Obama took office with a pledge to change U.S. counterterrorism policies, the Bush administration gave Vinas all the rights of American criminal suspects.

And he talked.

While an American citizen captured in Pakistan certainly presents a unique case, the circumstances of Vinas’ treatment may point to a new emphasis in the fight against terror, one that relies more on FBI crimefighters and the civilian justice system than on CIA interrogators and military detention.

Vinas provided “an intelligence gold mine” to U.S. officials, including possible information about a suspected militant who was killed in a Predator drone strike last November, says a senior law enforcement official, one of several authorities who spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to discuss the case publicly.

Another law enforcement official said that under questioning, the 26-year-old Vinas gradually provided a “treasure trove” of information, allowing U.S. counterterrorism officials to peer deep inside the inner workings of al-Qaida.

The FBI first learned about Vinas after Pakistani police arrested him in November 2008 in Peshawar, a city teeming with Taliban militants and al-Qaida operatives along Pakistan’s northwest border with Afghanistan.

Vinas, born in Queens and raised as a Roman Catholic on Long Island, was turned over to the FBI. Authorities have long been concerned about al-Qaida’s interest in recruiting outsiders who can blend in easily. It was not the first time an American had gone to Pakistan for Jihad. Others had preceded him such as the imprisoned “American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh and convicted terrorist Jose Padilla.

At first after his capture, Vinas appeared scared and dejected. When he was brought back to the United States, an official said, he “started to turn the corner” and trust them, little by little.

One of the first leads he gave investigators was admitting to his own role in helping al-Qaida plan an attack on U.S. soil.

“I consulted with a senior al-Qaida leader and provided detailed information about the operation of the Long Island Rail Road system which I knew because I had ridden the railroad on many occasions,” Vinas later told a judge in a secret guilty plea to terrorism charges. Vinas said the terrorists wanted to launch a bomb attack on the train system.

It was Vinas’ information about those conversations, officials said, that led authorities to issue a security warning last year around the Thanksgiving holidays about a possible plot against New York City-area transit systems.

Once Vinas was placed in U.S. custody, FBI agents spent a period of months conducting approximately 100 interviews with the man, a Muslim convert who spoke Arabic, Dari and Urdu.

Vinas, whose father hails from Peru and his mother from Argentina, told officials he left for Pakistan in September 2007, arriving in Lahore. He made his way to Peshawar.

Intelligence experts say that his terror bosses first sent him on a mission to fire missiles at a U.S. base in Afghanistan, most likely a way for them to test his loyalty. The first attack was not launched because of radio problems and the second failed to hit the base, according to Vinas.

After the botched mission, he agreed to become a suicide bomber and returned to Peshawar for more religious training.

In March 2008, Vinas later told his FBI interrogators, he turned up in Waziristan, a mountainous border region in Pakistan where Osama bin Laden and other terror leaders are suspected of hiding out.

There, he met a former Belgian taxi driver of Moroccan origin who “spouted off ideas about the possibility of attacking soccer stadiums in Europe, but didn’t give a plan or details,” according to a sworn statement Vinas later gave to Belgian prosecutors. The man also had been giving “speeches during Friday prayers at his local mosque where he served as the imam.”

In Waziristan, the Belgian had taken training in constructing electric circuits used in combat operations such as improvised explosive devices and suicide jackets. Vinas told authorities he also took terror training in Waziristan, taught to handle weapons and plastic explosives, including C-3, C-4 and Semtex.

Vinas learned about voltage meters and battery tests and bomb circuits — the ingredients for a remote-detonated bomb — and how to rig an explosives-laden jacket for suicide bombers.

“The students familiarized themselves with seeing, sensing and touching different explosives,” he told investigators.

Vinas described all this to the FBI, pinpointing the locations with photographs and maps and aiding bureau sketch artists. He answered every question FBI agents posed to him, one official said, and the information was shared with the intelligence community.

If it was “worthwhile and worth sharing, we put it out immediately,” the official said.

Vinas’ most important contribution, authorities said, was disclosing the locations of safe houses and suspected terrorists, officials said.

One of the operatives Vinas discussed with investigators was an al-Qaida recruiter, Abdullah Azzam, according to one official who spoke to The Associated Press about the case.

Azzam died in an airstrike on Nov. 19, about the time Vinas was taken into custody. Officials declined to say whether Azzam or others that Vinas discussed with authorities were targeted in Predator airstrikes with his assistance.

Vinas pleaded guilty Jan. 28 to conspiring to murder U.S. nationals. He faces life in prison, but his cooperation will likely earn him a reduced sentence.

AP writer Devlin Barrett reported from Washington.

Copyright © 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

The tendencies of defiance and anarchy can be discouraged if the PPP-led government pays serious attention to improving governance and bridging the gap between the policy pronouncements of its leaders and performance of the government

Violent protests against electricity outages and hikes in petrol and diesel prices last week raised a host of issues, especially about these protests’ implications for civic order and the future of democracy in Pakistan. Was the defiant and anarchic behaviour of the protesters aimed only at registering protest or did it have a wider political agenda of targeting the federal government? This may be the emergence of a new type of violent popular disposition and political culture that threatens democracy.

The protests took place in the major cities of all provinces, although their intensity varied. Invariably the offices of WAPDA or power generation companies, state property and banks were ransacked by the rioting crowd. There were clashes with the police in some places, including Karachi and Hyderabad.

The protests were more widespread and violent in Punjab. Even district and sub-district level areas experienced violence. Electricity-related offices and public property was ransacked in most places. The protesters paralysed normal functioning of business and commercial activities and ordinary people found it difficult to undertake their routine affairs. In some places, the police had to resort to baton charge and tear gas to disperse the rioting crowd. Regular traffic was disrupted by protesters in almost all cities. Some of them went to the extent of stopping railway trains, and, in Jhang, some coaches of a railway train were set on fire.

The pro-PMLN businessmen and traders in Lahore were very active in forcing the suspension of business and commercial activity. Some of them demanded that the federal government resign on account of electricity outages.

Street protest is a legitimate right of the people as the last resort. However, this does not give them right to ransack public and private property and terrorise people. It has been noticed for the last four to five years that protesters appear more interested in making life difficult for others, disrupting normal business and routine city life, causing traffic jams and ransacking property rather than in mobilising support for their demands. Their underlying consideration appears to be that one can draw attention by demonstrating the capacity to disrupt normal life in a city or town. This also demonstrates poor understanding of their responsibilities as citizens.

It is generally observed that aggrieved people have a tendency to walk out of their workplaces or institutions and block nearby roads by erecting roadblocks or setting fire to tyres or other material in the middle of the road. Sometimes, a small group of young people suddenly appears on the road, sets up barricades, lights fires in a commando-like operation and disappears quickly. At times such people also engage in violence and ransack business and commercial centres, official property and especially banks.

In February 2006, a large number of young people protesting in Lahore against the publication of “cartoons” in a European country turned violent without any provocation and engaged in unprecedented arson and looting. The religious parties that had sponsored the rally refused to take responsibility for what happened, declaring that their workers were not involved.

Disruption of traffic has become an established method of protest. The first thing students do to protest is to come out of their institutions and block traffic. In the case of the latest protest against electricity outages, protesters created an anarchic situation in some cities. They also stopped railway trains. In a separate development, when railway workers protested in favour of their demands in Lahore, they attempted to disrupt railway traffic.

It is a dangerous trend; more and more people are resorting to the disruption of civic life and causing inconvenience to ordinary people as a protest strategy. Now, there are more instances of interference with railway traffic. This has negative implications for the current efforts to revive and institutionalise democracy. The success of democracy depends on developing a moderate and tolerant disposition towards socio-political and economic issues, which need to be addressed through the democratic institutions and processes.

The prospects for democracy cannot improve if issues are to be settled in the street, and protest is not viewed as effective unless it becomes violent or disrupts normal functions of society. If democracy is to be stabilised and the prospects for non-democratic and unconstitutional changes are to be minimised, political leaders should work towards problem solving through democratic institutions and processes as set out in the constitution and law.

The opposition, especially the PMLN, may be getting grudging satisfaction from the current protest because it discredits the PPP-led coalition government. They may think that the unpopularity of the current government improves their prospects in the next general elections.

While there may be some electoral gains for the PMLN due to mismanagement of the electricity shortage by the government, this does not necessarily mean that the protests are PPP-centric, and that if the PMLN comes to power it will not face a similar challenge in the streets.

Political leaders should worry about the rise of a culture of defiance and anarchy in Pakistan. If politically active circles imbibe these political orientations, they tend to use them as a routine strategy to pursue their agenda. If the operating political norms are defiance, street agitation, disruption of civic life and economic activity, there is little hope for democracy.

Political leaders should not encourage defiance among people as was done by Nawaz Sharif after the Supreme Court disqualified him from contesting elections in February 2009. His public addresses in the immediate aftermath of this development called upon the police and civil servants to defy the government. If a politician encourages people to defy his political adversaries, what is the guarantee that these methods will not be used against him? If sections of the population imbibe violent protest and anarchic methods as normal instruments for advancing political agendas, they will use them against any government if and when needed.

The tendencies of defiance and anarchy can be discouraged if the PPP-led government pays serious attention to improving governance and bridging the gap between the policy pronouncements of its leaders and performance of the government. It needs to rectify the perception that electricity outages are partly caused by negligence and non-payment of dues to private power producers. The other perception is that the presidency is pursing state affairs in a personalised manner and assigns premium to loyalty over professionalism and judicious management.

No matter if the judiciary is supportive of democracy and the military wants to limit itself to its professional role, civilian democratic institutions can still run into serious problems if the political leaders do not pursue their divergent agendas with moderation and within constitutional limits in letter and spirit. Societal groups need to subscribe to democratic and constitutional norms for pursuing their demands. If they repeatedly resort to violent methods and create anarchy either on the encouragement of some political leaders or on their own, democracy will never stabilise.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has arrived on a four-day visit to India, a country she knows well and where she is immensely popular.

But her visit comes at a sensitive time in relations between Washington and Delhi, a time when key geopolitical issues hang in the balance.

Mrs Clinton first visited India in 1995 as US first lady, a trip that helped break the ice between two countries on opposite sides of the Cold War fence.

It also paved the way for her husband’s immensely successful visit five years later.

She now returns as a representative of US President Barack Obama and will find that Indians are a bit apprehensive of her new leader.

While former President George W Bush is credited with transforming relations with India – the cornerstone of which was a landmark civilian nuclear agreement – Mr Obama’s regional focus has been entirely on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Cashing in

But Washington knows it cannot afford to ignore India.

In a front-page article in the Times of India newspaper on Friday, Mrs Clinton wrote that close co-operation between India and the United States was vital to tackle global security threats, nuclear proliferation and climate change.

“I hope a new era of stronger co-operation between India and the United States will be one of the signature accomplishments of our new governments,” she wrote. “The world has a lot riding on our co-operation.”

Key to that close relationship is the economy.

The US is India’s largest trading partner, with investments of close to $10bn (£6bn). But India too is investing heavily in the US economy, its stake valued at some $3.7bn (£2.3bn) last year.

With the civilian nuclear trade agreement in place, the US is hoping to cash in.

During her visit, Mrs Clinton is expected to announce the location of two nuclear power plants that US companies will build.

A recent report by the Confederation of Indian Industry says that India intends to import 24 nuclear reactors in the next 10-15 years, creating “as many as 20,000 new jobs directly and indirectly in the US from nuclear trade”.

Delhi is also in the market for some 125 new fighter aircraft to replace ageing Soviet-era planes, and the US is locked in competition with France, Britain and Russia to win the multi-million dollar deal.

Sharp differences

But the Obama administration also needs Delhi’s co-operation on three key global issues which are among its key policy objectives – nuclear non-proliferation, climate change, and a new world trade treaty.

How did it happen?

Ms Bhutto was attacked as she was leaving a rally of her Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) supporters in the garrison town of Rawalpindi.

She was standing upright in the her armoured vehicle, with her head exposed above the open roof escape hatch, waving to the crowd when an attacker opened fire.

Seconds later, a bomb was set off at the scene which left some 20 other people dead.

The exact cause of Ms Bhutto’s death is disputed. A report by the UK’s Scotland Yard says she was killed as a result of the explosion.

Ms Bhutto’s party has insisted it was the gunshots that killed her. They say they saw bullet wounds on her head while preparing her body for burial.

The British police report released on 8 February said the impact of the explosion forced Ms Bhutto’s head to collide violently against the side of the escape hatch.

The report also said the attack was the work of one person, who first fired at Ms Bhutto’s vehicle and then set off a suicide bomb.

Video footage of the attack aired on TV had led to speculation that Ms Bhutto had been targeted by two people, working in a team.

The British police said its work had been complicated by failures to conduct an autopsy on Ms Bhutto’s body and preserve evidence from the crime scene.

However, the team said, “the evidence that is available is sufficient for reliable conclusions to be drawn”.

The British police investigated the assassination of Ms Bhutto at the request of Pakistan’s government.

Their report appears to support the government’s view, announced days after the attack on Ms Bhutto, that she died as a result of head injuries rather than gunshot wounds.

At the time, the PPP described the government’s verdict as “dangerous nonsense”.

What was the impact of Ms Bhutto’s death?

Ms Bhutto was the dominant figure among Pakistan’s various secular and religious political parties.

She had twice served as prime minister and was hoping that the PPP would emerge as a major player in forthcoming elections, the first to be held since President Musharraf resigned as head of the army and became a civilian leader.

Western-educated and charismatic, she presented herself as a moderate, democratic force.

She was widely courted in the West, where it was hoped she could restore popular legitimacy to President Musharraf’s faltering campaign against Islamist militants.

For the time being, her death has left a political vacuum.

However, the wave of popular sympathy triggered by her assassination could strengthen the PPP’s showing in the 18 February elections.

Her only son, 19-year-old Bilawal, has been named as the PPP’s new president, but is expected to remain a figurehead while he finishes his education.

In the meantime, the party is being led by Ms Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, and PPP stalwart Makhdoom Amin Fahim.

Ms Bhutto and Mr Musharraf had been working on a power-sharing agreement.

The talks failed, leaving Ms Bhutto as a major rival to President Musharraf, rather than an ally.

Who could have targeted her in this way?

The government has blamed the attack on Baitullah Mehsud, a pro-Taleban tribal leader in South Waziristan region, abutting the Afghan border.

The CIA supports this view.

But a spokesman for Mr Mehsud has denied any involvement, calling the accusation “government propaganda”.

Nevertheless, pro-Taleban and al-Qaeda militants who have taken control of Pakistan’s tribal areas along the Afghan border have been linked by many analysts to the attack.

They made no secret of their determination to kill Ms Bhutto after her return to the country in October following years of self-imposed exile.

However, elements within Ms Bhutto’s party believe her killing could not have taken place without the collusion of senior figures in the military and political establishment.

They have cited a letter Ms Bhutto released before her death in which she said she would hold President Musharraf’s government responsible for any attempt on her life.

How did President Musharraf react?

Mr Musharraf appealed for calm immediately after the assassination, as disturbances broke out in various parts of the country.

He also postponed the parliamentary elections that were due to have been held on 8 January.

Mr Musharraf’s popularity took a hammering during 2007, partly because of an intermittent military campaign against Islamist militants that alienated many but has yet to achieve clear results.

Only weeks before Ms Bhutto’s assassination, he ended a six-week period of emergency rule, during which he sidelined leading judges who were set to rule on whether he was entitled to stay on as president.

He recently stepped down as army chief and appointed a colleague, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, to carry on the fight against the militants.

Mr Musharraf hopes parties loyal to him will fare well at the polls, thereby shoring up his credentials as a civilian president.

What is at stake for the region and the rest of the world?

The future of Pakistan is one of the keys to global security. Pro-Taleban militants and their al-Qaeda allies have become a state within a state in recent years.

Militants fighting Western forces in Afghanistan and the government there of Hamid Karzai have been able to operate from within Pakistan.

Many major terror attacks on the West – including the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US and the 7 July 2005 attacks on London – have been traced to militants in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s military also has several nuclear weapons and there are fears these could pass into the hands of Islamist sympathisers if President Musharraf’s grip is weakened further.

Pakistan’s nuclear rival to the east, India, is watching the developments with concern.

Article Source: http://bbc.com

Ms Bhutto was a deeply controversial politician

Dawn.com

Ever notice how certain TV anchors and ‘political experts’ on various channels have subtly rearranged their dyed-in-the-wool narratives after an overall consensus against the Taliban started to build up? But many TV men are still at it; doing all they can to continue finding a few nodding heads for their rhetorical nay-sayings, and their rather pathetic spiels that smack of armchair reactionary-ism.

So what’s the post-consensus change in their stand then?

Last week on a political talk-show on a news channel, an anchor invited Dawn columnist, Kamran Shafi, and eminent scholar, Professor Mehdi Hassan. Like many of his contemporaries on other channels, this anchor, too, now found himself frustratingly bounded by the sudden consensual support the government and the army have managed to gather from majority of Pakistanis.

This seems to be an irritant for many self-righteous anchors. Because now if they do challenge army action in Swat and Waziristan, they might end up sounding unpatriotic. So here is how they’ve planed to counter their dilemma. Since most of them still seem to be frozen in the combative and reactionary mindset that they developed during the troubled Musharraf years, they have started taking the fight to the government in other areas of concern, one of which is the Lal Masjid debacle.

Coming back to the said TV show with Shafi and Prof. Hassan, the anchor kept questioning the two men on the issue of the army action in Lal Masjid, an episode that is now over two years old. Such anchors are only echoing a strategy discovered by political parties and politicians (such as the JI and the PTI), whose reactive narratives have been damaged most with the growing consensus against the Taliban.

Not happy with both Kamran Shafi and Prof. Mehdi Hassan’s advice to the media to continue supporting democratic forces (both in the government and opposition), so that demons like religious extremism can be kept at bay, the anchor suddenly quizzed them on how ‘the state murdered young children and women’ in Lal Masjid.
Even though most guests on talk shows when confronted with such questions usually start sounding apologetic — simply because such questions are posed as substantive truths whose challenging would be a blasphemous mistake — both Shafi and Prof. Hassan were in no mood to do that.

First of all, as the highly-charged fog of the Musharraf era clears, reports have started to appear that the number of women and children killed in the Lal Masjid operation might have been grossly exaggerated by the media.

Secondly, some frontline journalists — now even in the largely reactionary Urdu print and electronic media — have also started suggesting that whatever the number of children and women present in the mosque, they were actually used as human shields by militants. Almost everything about the Lal Masjid episode remains speculative and highly polemical.

But one thing was always clear, and this is also the point that Prof Hassan raised: How can anyone sympathise with what they saw on TV screens before the operation began?

Men with brand new Kalashnikovs, grenades and gas masks patrolling the roofs of Lal Masjid; burqa-clad women with dandas roaming the campus of the Jamia Hafsa; and young teenagers armed with bricks and stones. ‘Is that what a mosque is about?’ asked the professor.
Unmoved by the professor’s retort, the frustrated anchor then moved towards Kamran Shafi, claiming that the Lal Masjid episode was ‘staged by the state to gain the sympathy of the West.’

Of course, had the gentleman’s show been blessed by the likes of Imran Khan, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, PML(N)’s Saad Rafiq or any of the many loud cranks calling themselves ‘analysts’ out there, he would have got affirmative and equally rhetorical sound bytes, but Shafi had other ideas.

Answering the anchor’s assumption about the establishment’s hanky-panky during the Lal Masjid operation, Shafi stated, that (if such is the case), then why would the same establishment not allow the wife and daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to attend the hanged leader’s funeral, but fly the body of the extremist Lal Masjid cleric, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, to his hometown in a chartered military helicopter and allow thousands of people to attend his funeral?

Of course, Shafi was commenting on the stark difference in how the establishment has treated its democratic opponents compared to its assorted extremist nemesis, but anyone using this observation in the context of Lal Masjid should once and for all dispel the myth and romance that certain politicians and TV anchors continue to attach to the Lal Masjid personnel.

They are still treated as some kind of anti-elite heroes, when in essence, just like the Taliban, these militant clerics too were once cogs of the reactionary Pakistani state; cogs who failed to keep up with the changing nature of the game that the same friendly state now found itself playing after 9/11.

In other words, either we can call them Frankenstein monsters, or simply, spoiled Islamist brats who rebelled after dad started to change his ideological focus.

Absolutely nothing heroic about any of it.

The nation watches as the funeral corteges make their slow, solemn progress through the town on their way to a hospital in Oxford. Often, the coffins are met by relatives and friends who wait in Wootton Basset together with its inhabitants, the mayor, and the town crier. It is a moving scene that brings home the pain of a nation mourning its fallen soldiers.

Over the last fortnight, all the news from Afghanistan has been bad, with 15 British soldiers killed in 10 days. This sharp spike in casualties has triggered a fierce debate in the media about Britain’s war in Afghanistan. Ordinary citizens and journalists are questioning why the country is fighting in a distant land without any hope of success. But what is the measure of this elusive success? This is something that has been under discussion for months, ever since the fighting in Helmand became heavier, resulting in increasing casualties.

Thus far, opposition parties have been supporting the war effort, as opposing it would be construed as undermining the morale of the troops. This is something our politicians are not always in tune with. But as the number of war dead has mounted, questions are being asked about the government’s logistic support for the armed services.

Most of the casualties the army has sustained have been caused by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) placed by the roadside. Of late, these bombs have become more powerful and more sophisticated. There is some evidence that there has been a transfer of this technology from Iraq where it has been so successfully deployed against American ground forces.

Critics of the British effort have complained that soldiers, lacking enough helicopters, have to move around in lightly armoured vehicles where they are highly vulnerable to IED attacks. Indeed, one mother of a dead soldier has won the right to take the Ministry of Defence to court for sending her son out on patrol in a Snatch vehicle that is notoriously vulnerable to IEDs. The British war in Afghanistan has also opened a wider debate on the resources being allocated to the defence forces. Retired service chiefs have questioned the government’s priorities. While ground forces in Afghanistan have been starved of troops, properly armoured vehicles and helicopters, the navy has two aircraft carriers on order, while the nation’s ageing fleet of Trident intercontinental ballistic missiles will be replaced at a cost of 20 billion pounds. Both these expensive weapons systems are relics from the Cold War and were designed to counter the Soviet threat.

Their relevance today is more to do with Britain’s self-image as a major power than with any real military need. Many experts have questioned these priorities, and pointed out that these expensive toys are useless against the kind of asymmetric threat Britain faces today. Another reality politicians are unwilling to face is that while defence budgets have shrunk since the Sixties when Britain pulled back from its bases east of Suez, the role of the armed forces has not shrunk proportionally. For instance, British defence spending in 1967 was 6.7 per cent of GDP; it is now 2.9 per cent, dwarfed by the 5.6 per cent spent on education, and the 7.7 per cent allocated to health.

Clearly, with this kind of long-term decline in defence expenditure, something has to give. In this case, it was equipment for ground forces, together with a number of regiments that have been eliminated. So when Tony Blair decided to stand shoulder to shoulder with George Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq, the army is feeling the effect of past budget cuts.

A recent BBC/Guardian poll shows how divided the public is over Britain’s presence in Afghanistan. Although 47 per cent of those questioned support the war effort, a majority want the troops out by the end of the year. Only 36 per cent think they should stay until the job is done. But as ever, confusion persists over the nature of the job.

Quoting soldiers posting their views from the front, the Guardian published these blogs recently: ‘To be honest, the Taliban can move about pretty much as they please. Putting more troops on the ground will restrict them a little more, but will also mean more casualties for us.’ (Posted by Fallschirmjager). Bugsy writes: ‘… the job [in Afghanistan] will take at least the next seven years. It’s a war that we just can’t win and there’s no need for us to win it. The Afghans aren’t a danger to Europe. They don’t even know where it is… Far more dangerous are the nutters, mainly in Saudi Arabia…’

If, as an increasing number of military experts are saying, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won, what are British troops doing there? This question goes to the heart of the debate. Already, expectations are being scaled back: there is little talk now of liberal ideals like gender equality, democracy and good governance. These concepts have been replaced by ‘stability’ and ‘security’. But even these elements are in short supply.

Gordon Brown has been making the case that British troops are fighting and dying to make their country a safer place. The mantra of the day is: ‘We are fighting them over there so we don’t have to fight them over here.’ But how convincing is this call to a

By : rfan Husain Dawn.com

rms? While Al-Qaeda is a real and potent threat to the West, the Taliban are a strictly local group. However, the danger is that should the Taliban regain their control over the country, Osama Bin laden and his cohorts will have a free hand to conduct his operations against Western targets.

Peter Preston, writing in an article in the Guardian (‘Enough. This senseless folly in Afghanistan must stop’), argues persuasively: ‘There’s no ‘indefinite’ hope left around Afghanistan for Nato troops now. There are 184 British lives lost, and counting. Inescapably, the long overdue moment to stop has arrived – because none of the reasons for ploughing on makes the slightest sense.’

There is little doubt that with more coffins coming through Wootton Basset, the pressure on the government to withdraw will increase. And with elections due next year, Labour might well heed this call.

By : rfan Husain Dawn.com